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Case No. 20100726-CA
IN THE

UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff / Appellee,
vs.

RONDALD DEAN UDY,
Defendant/Appellant.

Brief of Appellee
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Defendant appeals from his sentence for securities fraud, a second
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-16, -21 (West 2000), and
false statements in a securities document, a third degree felony, in violation
of Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-16, -21 (West 2000). This Court has jurisdiction
under Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(e) (West 2009).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1. Did the trial court violate Defendant's double jeopardy rights where
it imposed only one sentence?
Standard of Review. Whether a trial court ruling violates double
jeopardy is reviewed for correctness. See State v. Rodrigues, 2009 UT 62, f 12,
218P.3d610.
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2. Did the trial court violate Defendant's rights to allocution and due
process when it first allowed allocution, continued sentencing to allow
Defendant to pay restitution, then ended the discussion when Defendant
himself said that he had not paid restitution?
Standard of Review. This Court ordinarily reviews whether a trial court
violated rule 22(a) (codifying the common law right of allocution) and due
process for correctness. See State v. Wanosik, 2001 UT App 241, f 9,31 P.3d
615, affirmed in part by 2003 UT 46, 79 P.3d 937.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
U.S. Const, amendments V & IV;
Utah Const, art. I, § 12;
Utah Code Ann. § 77-1-6 (WestSupp. 2010);
Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1 (West Supp. 2010);
Utah R. Crim. P. 22;
Utah R. Civ. P. 58A.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS AND STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant appeals from a sentence imposing the statutory term of
imprisonment on convictions for securities fraud and false statements on a
securities document. See Br. Aplt. at 1. The State charged Defendant with
four felony counts: two counts of securities fraud, second degree felonies,
and one count each of false statements on a securities document and sales by
an unlicensed broker-dealer or agent, third degree felonies. See R. at 1-3.
Defendant issued dozens of promissory notes to dozens of victims, in
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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violation of state securities laws, thereby fraudulently obtaining
approximately $15,000,000, misstated or concealed material facts such as his
obligations to repay several outstanding notes already issued in violation of
the Securities Act, the fact that the Division had revoked his securities license,
potential conflicts of interest, and various risk and suitability factors. See R.
at 7-12; 176-196.
Defendant entered into a plea agreement with the State, wherein the
State dismissed one count of securities fraud and the unlicensed dealer count,
and Defendant pleaded guilty to the remaining charges. See R. 125-141
(Statement of Defendant in Advance of Plea in Abeyance). The trial court
held these pleas in abeyance, conditioned on, among other things, Defendant
obeying all securities laws. See id.
As part of the plea in abeyance agreement, Defendant agreed to repay
all current identified note holders, which totaled dozens of victims. See id.
See also R. at 176-96 (Defendant's Motion to Exclude Victim Impact
Statements, identifying victims). Although the original charges extended to
only a handful of named victims, Defendant later conceded that the dozens
of note holders, who had not been named as victims in the original charges,
constituted victims for purposes of restitution. See R. at 224.

-3-Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Nine days after entering his plea in abeyance, Defendant violated the
terms of the agreement by soliciting further investment funds from one of the
victims in his criminal case. See R. at 144. Defendant solicited $50,000 from
that victim, after having previously defrauded her out of $242,667 and
having failed to return the investment. See R. at 144. On the State's motion
and after an evidentiary hearing, the trial court entered Defendant's guilty
pleas and convictions. See R. at 142-146; 167.
The court held two hearings on sentencing, one in May and one in
August. See R. 287 (Tr. of 3 May 2010 hearing), 288 (Tr. of 3 August 2010
hearing). At the May hearing, the trial court heard evidence and argument
from Defendant, his counsel, the prosecutor, and extensive comments from

>

Defendant's many victims. See generally R. 287'. The trial court received a
presentence investigative report from Adult Probation and Parole, which
recommended the statutory indeterminate prison term. See R. 174. In
response to this recommendation, Defendant and his attorney presented
<

argument and testimony that Defendant had the ability to repay the victims
with the proceeds of a multi-million dollar investment deal that would
shortly close. See R. 287:46-50.
Defendant claimed that he had "been dedicating 80 some odd hours a
week . . . for several years now" to bring this business deal to conclusion; that

<
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it was an "art project'' wherein he "matched them up with banks who are
getting together to fund it;" that the commission amounted to $15 million;
that the total project amounted to $600 million in value; that it was taking so
long because he had never done a project like this and "rather than taking the
asset right to the investors or the banks, we have had to get an insurance
wrap on it," which "kind of guarantees the asset of the investment to the
bankers;" that "I'm kind of a middle man" and "I've referred them to the
right people." R. 287 at 7-10.
The trial court at first indicated an intent to proceed with sentencing:
"I'm ready to sentence him." Id. at 51. The trial court then announced a
sentence that included a prison term of 1 to 15 years for the second degree
felonies and zero to 5 years on the third degree felony. Id. But the trial court
then immediately "stay[ed] imposition of that sentence" and stated an
intention to "make him do a year in jail," followed by 36 months' probation.
Id. The court then set the matter for "review" in August 2010, to allow
Defendant an opportunity to collect his promised commissions and repay the
victims. Id. In setting that date, the trial court asked Defendant how much
time he needed to close the deal and pay restitution. See id., at 50-51.
The trial court stated that Defendant would "do the year regardless,"
because the sentence should include "a little punitive aspect." Id. The trial

-5-
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court stated that it was "really skeptical" whether Defendant could actually
pay the approximately $15,000,000 in restitution within the few weeks
Defendant had asked for. Id. at 53. Although the court thought Defendant's
promises "sound[] like a lot of hot air," it nevertheless gave him the time he
asked. Id. It did so primarily at the request of several victims who spoke on
his behalf, some of whom believed they stood a better chance of being repaid
if Defendant had time to complete his business deal. See id. The trial court
finally stated, "if the money's not there, he's at least going to jail, and he may
go to prison." Id.
The trial court did not enter any sentence after the first hearing.
Rather, it issued an unsigned minute entry outlining the proposed prison
sentence and stating that the "prison term is suspended." R. 224-25. The
unsigned minute entry did not accurately reflect the court's statements at the
hearing in that it applied jail only to one count, and did not mention
probation at all. Cf. id., with R. 287:53.
At the August hearing, Defendant's attorney informed the trial court
that Defendant "has not been able to obtain the funds . . . to make substantial
restitution payments." R. 288:1. Counsel then provided the court with a
letter and an e-mail purporting to detail the status of the business deal that
Defendant had promised would allow him to pay full restitution. Id. Trial
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counsel then argued that immediate incarceration would impede Defendant's
ability to close the deal and pay restitution. Id. at 2. At that point, the trial
court stopped counsel and stated, "It's over. It's over." Id. The court
commented on Defendant's inability to pay restitution as promised, stating "I
don't believe this. I just don't believe it." Id. Then the court allowed the
prosecutor to respond to Defendant's submissions and argument. Id. at 2-3.
The prosecutor agreed with the court that Defendant's documents lacked
credibility. See id. at 3. The prosecutor then commented on Defendant's
lengthy history of promising to pay restitution but not following through.
See id. Defense counsel tried to comment further, but the trial court ended
the discussion: "No, no, no. We're not talking any more." Id.
The trial court then stated "I said jail time. I've revisited this in my
head . . . . He's going to prison to be taken forthwith . . . . " Id. Counsel for
Defendant reminded the court of its earlier intention to suspend the prison
sentence and impose jail instead. Id. at 4-5. The trial court listened to
counsel's arguments regarding jail versus prison. See id. Counsel did not
object to the prison commitment on double jeopardy grounds. Counsel
argued only that the trial court had previously allowed a "discount" from a
jail sentence if Defendant had paid some restitution by the time of the second
hearing. See id. at 3-4. The trial court corrected counsel's misunderstanding,

-7-
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saying "no discount. I didn't say discount/' Id. at 5. The court reiterated
that it had given Defendant time to pay restitution, that Defendant had lied
about the deal and could not pay restitution as promised, and that Defendant
therefore did not deserve a more lenient sentence. See id. The same day, the
trial court entered a signed minute entry imposing the statutory prison terms.
R. 228-29,
Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal. R. 233. He also filed in the
trial court a written motion under rule 22(e), Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure, urging the court to "honor its original sentence." R. 235 (Rule 22
Motion to Correct Sentence). Defendant's memorandum argued that the
May hearing constituted Defendant's final sentence, that the August hearing
constituted a review hearing of that sentence, and that payment of restitution
prior to the review hearing wras clearly not a term of probation or
prerequisite to receiving the benefit of the prior sentence. See R. 239-40.
Defendant reasoned that the imposition of prison was an illegal sentence
because it constituted a procedurally improper "sentence revision." Id. at
239. Defendant never asserted that the imposition of sentence after the
August hearing violated double jeopardy. The trial court has not ruled on
Defendant's rule 22(e) motion.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
For the first time on appeal, Defendant argues that the trial court's
sentencing at the August hearing violated double jeopardy because it
imposed prison— a harsher sentence — after the court had already
pronounced a more lenient sentence—jail and probation. There was no
double jeopardy violation, however, because sentence was imposed only
once — after the second sentencing hearing. A trial court violates double
jeopardy when it increases a sentence already finally imposed; it cannot
violate double jeopardy the first and only time it imposes sentence.
Defendant therefore had no legitimate expectation of finality in the
trial court's statements in May about the sentence it intended to impose.
Moreover, the trial court told Defendant at the May hearing to expect a
different outcome in August if he did not pay restitution before then. The
August hearing thus constituted a continuation of the May sentencing
hearing, and nothing about the trial court's actions or words would lead a
reasonable defendant to expect otherwise. Without such an expectation,
double jeopardy does not prohibit sentencing at the August hearing.
Defendant has not shown his right to allocute was violated when he
did in fact allocute. Defendant and his counsel were given free rein to speak
at the May hearing. In fact, it was Defendant's representations that he could
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pay restitution if given enough time that convinced the judge to consider
probation and to hold off imposing sentence in May. Although the trial court
did cut off counsel's arguments at the August hearing, it cut off argument
only related to Defendant's excuses why the deal did not go through, and
presumably a request for yet more time to pay. The trial court, however, had
already given Defendant the opportunity to present a full mitigation
argument at the May hearing. The trial court was not required to give
Defendant another opportunity to rehash what had already been decided.
In any event, Defendant has not demonstrated that he suffered any
harm from his inability to continue further allocution because he has not
shown what else he had to say, nor has he shown that anything he would
have said would have made any difference in the outcome at sentencing in
August.
ARGUMENT
Defendant brings two challenges to his sentence, imposed at the
August hearing. First, he argues that the imposition of prison violated
double jeopardy because it constituted an increase from the sentence he
received at the May hearing. See Br. Aplt. at 17. Second, he argues that the
sentence was imposed in an illegal manner because the trial court did not
allow him to allocute at the August hearing. See id, at 32.
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Defendant preserved neither claim below. He seeks to circumvent the
preservation rules by challenging his sentence as illegal under rule 22(e),
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, claiming that the sentence is "'manifestly
or patently illegal.'" Br. Aplt. at 31 (citing State v. Candedo, 2010 UT 32, \ 9,
232 P.3d 1008). Rule 22(e) provides that a "court may correct an illegal
sentence, or a sentence imposed in an illegal mariner, at any time." Utah R.
Crim. P. 22(e).
Assuming, without conceding, that rule 22(e) provides a remedy for
violations of double jeopardy at sentencing, Defendant has not demonstrated
a double jeopardy violation.
I.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT VIOLATE DEFENDANT'S
DOUBLE JEOPARDY RIGHTS BECAUSE IT STAYED
IMPOSITION OF THE SENTENCE AT THE MAY HEARING
AND THEREFORE DID NOT CREATE A LEGITIMATE
EXPECTATION OF FINALITY
Defendant argues that imposition of the prison sentence at the August
hearing violated his rights against double jeopardy embodied in both the
federal and Utah constitutions.1 See Br. Aplt. at 17. The August sentence did

1

Although Defendant cites case law for the proposition that the Utah double
jeopardy clause offers greater protection than its federal counterpart, see Br.
Aplt. at 19, he does not articulate the scope or operation of that greater
protection or demonstrate that, as applied to this case, the Utah Constitution
offers protection that the federal provision would not. See State v. Van Dyke,
2009 UT App 369,1f 17 n.4,223 P.3d 465, cert, denied, 230 P.3d 127 (Utah 2010)
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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not violate double jeopardy because (1) the trial court entered only one
sentence; and (2) the tentative sentence discussed at the May hearing could
not have given rise to a legitimate expectation of finality.
A. Double jeopardy prohibits resentencing after a prior sentence
gives a defendant a legitimate expectation of finality.
The double jeopardy clause provides: "[N]or shall any person be
subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb . . . . "
U.S. Const, amend. V. In the context of sentencing, this clause provides
"protection against multiple punishments for the same offense/" State v.
Rodrigues, 2009 UT 62, f 36, 218 P.3d 610 (quoting Bernat v. Allphin, 2005 UT
1, f 11,106 P.3d 707); see also State v. One Hundred Seventy-Five Thousand Eight
Hundred Dollars, 942 P.2d 343, 349 (Utah 1997); State v. Maguire, 1999 UT App
45, Tf 7,975 P.2d 476.
But "'[sentencing procedures traditionally receive less double
jeopardy protection than do prosecutions/" and even "'resentencing per se
does not implicate the double jeopardy protection from multiple

(requiring state constitutional analysis to demonstrate "how the court's
analysis . . . would differ from its consideration under the federal
constitution"). Moreover, his constitutional analysis proceeds solely under
the federal analysis. The State therefore likewise presents only a federal
constitutional analysis. "In the absence of a separate and distinct argument
under the Utah Constitution," this Court should consider "Defendant's
claims only under the Federal Constitution." State v. Despain, 2007 UT App
367,112,173 P.3d 213.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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punishments/ 7 Maguire, 1999 UT App 45, f 11, (citation omitted) (alteration
in original). The lynchpin of the double jeopardy inquiry in sentencing is the
existence of a legitimate expectation of finality of an original sentence. See
DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117,136-37,101 S. Ct. 426 (1980) (the double jeopardy
clause protects the finality of criminal judgments and prohibits alterations to
sentences carrying a legitimate expectation of finality); Rodrigues, 2009 UT 62,
f 36 ("7[T]he Double Jeopardy Clause only proscribes resentencing where the
defendant has developed a legitimate expectation of finality in his original
sentence/77) (quoting Maguire, 1999 UT App 45, f 8) (additional quotation
omitted); see also United States v. Fogel, 829 F.2d 77, 87 (D.C. Cir. 1987) ("If a
defendant has a legitimate expectation of finality, then an increase in [his]
sentence is prohibited by the double jeopardy clause. If, however, there is
some circumstance which undermines the legitimacy of that expectation,
then a court may permissibly increase the sentence.77).
B. Because the trial court entered only one sentence, double
jeopardy is not implicated.
The trial court explicitly stayed imposition of the sentence at the May
hearing. Although it initially indicated an intent to proceed with sentencing
at the May hearing, see R. 287:51 ("I'm ready to sentence him.77), and
announced a prison sentence, it then immediately 77stay[ed] the imposition of
that sentence.77 Id. This fact alone prevented jeopardy from attaching, as
-13-
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demonstrated below, and the sentence imposed in August was the first and
only sentence that Defendant ever received.
The tentative sentence discussed at the May hearing was not final
because the trial court declined to enter a final judgment of conviction and
sentence. A judgment is entered when it is signed by the judge and filed
with the clerk. See Utah R. Civ. P. 58A(c). It is well-established that an
unsigned minute entry is not a final judgment. See Ron Shepherd Ins. v.
Shields, 882 P.2d 650, 653 (Utah 1994). Jeopardy does not attach to a sentence
announced in an unsigned minute entry where the trial court expressly
declines to impose final sentence pending review of further information. See
State v. Horrocks, 2001 UT App 4, f f 23-25,17 P.3d 1145 (stating "the
requirement of a final signed order signals that the court has issued its final
decision on sentencing and jeopardy attaches at that point to preclude further
modification of the sentence").
Defendant argues that he legitimately expected finality in the jail
sentence, but as shown, the trial court did not in fact impose a jail sentence.
Indeed, it did not impose any sentence at all at the May hearing. The trial
court's entire discussion of jail or prison at the May hearing turned on
whether Defendant had paid restitution by the August hearing, see R. 287:5153, and the court did not commit Defendant to jail or place him on probation.
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See R. at 224-25. Defendant could not legitimately expect finality in a
sentence that the trial court did not in fact impose.
The trial court's retention of jurisdiction over the sentence, and the fact
that it did not enter a signed judgment, prevented jeopardy from attaching to
the tentative May sentence. See Horrocks, 2001 UT App 4, ^ 25 ("A trial court
may . . . change an oral sentencing decision when it has specifically reserved
that option pending receipt of further information relevant to sentencing and
the sentencing decision is not binding on the court until a final written order
is entered/7). Defendant concedes that the trial court retained jurisdiction
over the sentence when it did not enter a signed judgment. See Br. Aplt. at
26. He argues only that his expectation of finality prohibited the court from
later entering judgment contrary to that expectation. See id. at 26-27.2 But
Defendant could have had no legitimate expectation of finality where the

2

Defendant cites State v. Todd for the proposition that '"the date of the
oral announcement of the sentence to the defendant is the date of imposition
of sentence for all purposes/" Br. Aplt. 27 (citing 2006 UT 7, \ 8 & n.2,128
P.3d 1199). Todd is inapposite here because it dealt with the very narrow
question of when sentence is "imposed" for purposes of establishing the
jurisdictional time limit for filing a motion for new trial and did not consider
the question of when jeopardy attaches to a sentence. See id. Rather than
looking to appellate jurisdiction case law, this Court should look to Horrocks,
a double jeopardy case, for the proper framework for analyzing when
jeopardy attaches to judgments. See generally, 2001 UT App 4.
-15-
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trial court retained jurisdiction over sentencing and did not enter a signed
judgment until after the August hearing. See Horrocks, 2001 UT App 4, f 25.
C

Even if the unimposed May sentence were considered,
Defendant did not have a legitimate expectation of finality in
the announced, but unimposed sentence.
Defendant claims he formed a legitimate expectation of finality in the

sentence discussed at the May hearing, despite the fact that the trial court did
not actually impose sentence. See Br. Aplt. at 26-27. But any expectation
Defendant formed was not legitimate because it was contradicted by the trial
court's words and actions at the May hearing. Indeed Defendant's counsel
below demonstrated that he understood the contingent nature of the May
sentence. Defendant could not form a legitimate expectation of finality in a
sentence that the trial court did not enter.
It is true that the trial court did indicate the possibility of jail and
probation; but that indication clearly amounted to the minimum amount of
time Defendant would serve, depending on the outcome of the August
hearing. The court stated that Defendant would "do the year regardless,"
because the sentence should include "a little punitive aspect." R. 287:51. The
trial court added that it was "really skeptical" whether Defendant could
actually pay the approximately $15,000,000 in restitution within the few
weeks Defendant had asked for. Id. at 53. And although the court thought
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Defendant's promises "sound[ed] like a lot of hot air," it nevertheless gave
him the time he asked to pay restitution. Id. The trial court finally stated, "if
the money's not there, he's at least going to jail, and he may go to prison!' Id.
(emphasis added). On the same day, the court issued an unsigned minute
entry outlining the prison sentence and indicating that the "prison term is
suspended." R. 224-25. Even if the unsigned minute entry did not alone
determine that the judgment was not final for double jeopardy purposes, it
nevertheless rebuts the legitimacy of Defendant's expectation of finality
because it gave further indication that the trial court did not intend its
tentative May sentence to be final. Simply put, the trial court did everything
it reasonably could to prevent its May sentence from becoming the final
judgment, and any contrary expectation Defendant formed was not
legitimate in light of the court's words and actions.
1. Defendant did not in fact hold an expectation of finality
because the trial court told him he could go to prison, and
the record demonstrates he understood that.
In addition to refraining from imposing a final sentence, the court told
Defendant that the sentence proposed at the May hearing depended entirely
on Defendant's subsequent behavior and that the sentence would be finally
decided in August. See R. 287:51-53. The trial court told Defendant he might
be sent to prison should he not pay restitution by August. See id. at 53. And

-17-
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Defendant's trial counsel stated at the August hearing that he understood
that whether or not Defendant received any incarceration depended on
whether Defendant had paid restitution by that date. See R. 288:2. Although
Defendant hoped for imposition of jail rather than prison at the August
hearing, see id. at 4, the fact that he knew that the sentence would not be
imposed until the trial court received further information regarding his
promised deal undercuts his claim that he subjectively expected finality from
the May sentence.
Defendant now argues that "he legitimately understood that he would
remain on probation, but would serve a year in jail." Br. Aplt. at 29. But the
trial court never placed him on probation; the unsigned minute entry from
the May hearing said nothing about probation; and the judge's statements
regarding probation referred to future probation after serving some
commitment. R. 287:51. Defendant therefore could not legitimately have
understood he was placed on probation at the May hearing, that restitution
was a condition of probation, or that the August hearing amounted to a
revocation of that probation.
Defendant incongruently argues that imposition of the previouslyannounced jail term after consideration of further information would not
have violated double jeopardy, but that imposition of the previously-
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announced prison term after consideration of further information did. See Br.
Aplt. at 29. Whichever way Defendant now wishes to characterize his
expectations after the May hearing, he knew that the May sentence was not
final. He therefore cannot demonstrate a violation of double jeopardy.
2. Because Defendant did not have a legitimate expectation of
finality in the May sentence, the August sentence did not
violate double jeopardy.
Absent a legitimate expectation of finality in a sentence, double
jeopardy does not bar the imposition of an increased sentence. See Rodrigues,
2009 UT 62, f 39 (absent legitimate expectation of finality in sentence not
accurately reflecting plea agreement, subsequent increase in restitution
arising from correction of error did not violate double jeopardy protections);
Maguire, 1999 UT App 45, % f 8-12 (defendant who voluntarily withdrew
guilty plea had no legitimate expectation of finality in original proceedings,
and subsequent increase in sentence did not violate Double Jeopardy Clause);
see also DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. at 139 (absent legitimate expectation of finality in
original sentence, commencement of sentence did not prevent subsequent
increase in sentence under statute); United States v. Rourke, 984 F.2d 1063,1066
(10th Cir. 1992) ("When a second sentence imposed on resentencing is more
severe than the original sentence, the relevant double jeopardy analysis
requires that we ask whether the defendant had a legitimate expectation of
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finality in his original sentence[;]" if not, the increase in sentence did not
implicate double jeopardy concerns) (emphasis added); see also Romero v.
People, 179 P.3d 984, 989-90 (Colo. 2007) ("[DJouble jeopardy does not bar the
imposition of an increased sentence if the defendant lacked a legitimate
expectation of finality in the sentence/'); People v. Adams, 128 P.3d 260,261
(Colo. App. 2005) ("punishment for a criminal offense can be increased
without violating the double jeopardy protections . . . when a defendant has
no legitimate expectation of finality in his or her sentence"); Sentence Review
Panel v. Moseley, 663 S.E.2d 679, 683-84 (Ga. 2008) (where statute provided for
modification of sentence after imposition, sentence was not final, no
expectation of finality arose, and double jeopardy did not preclude
subsequent increase in sentence); State v. Gefroh, 458 N.W.2d 479,483 (N.D.
1990) (absent legitimate expectation in finality of sentence, subsequent
imposition of harsher sentence not prohibited by double jeopardy).
Nothing in the character of the trial court's actions or statements in
May would have led a reasonable person to expect finality. The record, read
in its entirety, clearly demonstrates that the trial court was not finished
sentencing Defendant in May, and Defendant himself knew that. At
Defendant's own request, the trial court afforded him time to make one final
effort to pay restitution before deciding the question of incarceration. See R.
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287:49-50. The trial court never stated that jail would commence after the
August hearing depending on whether Defendant had paid restitution;
rather, it stated that even if Defendant had paid restitution, "he's at least
going to go to jail, and he may go to prison." R. 287:53. Defendant may have
gotten his hopes up that the trial court would impose only jail if he did not
pay restitution by August, but that is a far cry from a legitimate expectation
of finality given the trial court's pronouncements.
In short, viewing the record in its entirety, the August hearing
constituted a continuation of the May sentencing hearing. The trial court
waited until it received all pertinent information, and reluctantly indulged
Defendant's far-fetched and ultimately unfulfilled promises, before
pronouncing a final judgment. See R. 228-29 (Minutes, Sentence, Judgment,
Commitment, signed by judge). Defendant could not legitimately expect
finality from a sentencing proceeding only half-completed. Without that
legitimate expectation, the double jeopardy clause did not prohibit the
sentence entered in August, and Defendant's claim fails.

-21-
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II.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT VIOLATE DEFENDANT'S
RIGHT OF ALLOCUTION BECAUSE THE TRIAL COURT
AFFORDED HIM A FULL AND FAIR OPPORTUNITY TO
PRESENT HIS MITIGATION CASE AND ADDRESS THE
RELEVANT ISSUES
Defendant argues that the trial court violated his right to allocute at the
August hearing by "repeatedly interrupting] defense counsel when he
attempted to speak/' and by denying "defense counsel the 'opportunity to
address the court and present reasonably reliable and relevant information in
the mitigation of a sentence/" Br. Aplt. at 36 (quoting State v. Wanosik, 2003
UT46,1f23,79P.3d937). 3

.

3

Defendant also complains that, at the August hearing, the trial court
did not ask if there was any legal reason not to proceed with sentencing and
did not allow defense counsel to raise any inaccuracies in the presentence
report. See Br. Aplt. at 36. However, at the May hearing the trial court
verified with defense counsel that there was no legal reason not to proceed
with sentencing, and defense counsel addressed the presentence report. See
R. 287:3-4. Thus, the trial court did comply with the dictates of rule 22(a) and
Defendant's arguments lack merit.
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Whether this Court considers Defendant's allocution claim under rule
22(e),4 under the plain error doctrine, or as a preserved claim, the record
demonstrates that he did allocute at both the May and August hearings. He
presented a complete case in mitigation, and provided comment on the
relevant evidence at the August hearing. At some point, a trial court may
decide that it has received enough argument and evidence and may rule,
despite a defendant's desires to present more. And even if the sentencing
court erred by interrupting defense counsel at sentencing, Defendant has not
established prejudice resulting from that error. He must show, but has not,
that he would have provided the sentencing court with evidence or argument
that would have resulted in a more favorable outcome. He has not identified
what he would have said that would have justified a more lenient sentence.

4

Rule 22(e) does not provide a ground for appellate review of
Defendant's allocution claim: "Rule 22(e) is not properly invoked for
ordinary or 'run-of-the mill' errors/' such as "a denial of due process
resulting from a trial court's failure to consider mitigating evidence."
Candedo, 2010 UT 32 at f 9 n.2, 232 P.3d 1008 (internal quotation marks and
citations omitted). See also State v. Thorkelson, 2004 UT App 9, f 15, 84 P.3d
854 (holding claims that trial court failed to consider proper statutory factors
at sentencing were not claims of "patently" or "manifestly" illegal sentence,
and thus not cognizible under rule 22(e)).
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
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A, Defendant allocuted at the May hearing by presenting his
overall case for mitigation, and he presented and commented
upon all evidence received at the August hearing.
Defendant argues that the trial court erred by "repeatedly
interrupting] defense counsel when he attempted to speak" and by denying
defense counsel "the 'opportunity to address the court and present
reasonably reliable and relevant information in the mitigation of a sentence/"
Br. Aplt. at 36 (quoting Wanosik, 2003 UT 46 at f 23). Defendant further
argues that the trial court erred because it did not affirmatively afford him
the opportunity to personally address the court. See id.
Viewed as a whole, the record demonstrates that Defendant and
counsel did allocute. x\s demonstrated in Point I, above, the August hearing
was merely a continuation and conclusion of the sentencing hearing that
began in May. At the May hearing, defense counsel assured the court that
"we're ready to proceed with sentencing." R. 287:3. The court asked, "So
there's no legal reason why we ought not to proceed with sentencing?" Id.
Counsel replied, "No, Your Honor." Id. Before receiving statements from
several of Defendant's victims, the trial court asked counsel, "Do you have
anything you'd like to say on [Defendant's] behalf before sentencing?" Id. at
4. Counsel then addressed the court, both making a case in mitigation and
discussing Defendant's efforts to make restitution. See id. at 4-8,14-15.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
-24Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Counsel addressed AP&P's prison recommendation. See id. at 4. At times,
the sentencing judge engaged counsel in dialogue, allowing him to address
specific concerns that the court had regarding Defendant's restitution
obligations and his ability to pay. See id. at 4,5, 8. The court then invited
Defendant himself to address the restitution concerns, and allowed
Defendant to make a plea for leniency. See id. at 8-14. The court received
extensive comment from multiple victims, followed by comments by the
prosecutor. See id. at 14-46. The court then engaged defense counsel once
again in dialogue regarding Defendant's ability to pay restitution. See id. at
46-51. Defendant concedes that he allocuted fully at the May hearing. See Br.
Aplt. at 35.
After the parties all said everything they had to say, the court
announced its tentative sentence, before continuing the matter to allow
Defendant time to pay restitution: "I'm going to give him that time frame and
if the money's not there, he's at least going to go to jail, and he may go to
prison." Id. at 51-53. Thus, the single question to be answered at the August
hearing was whether Defendant paid restitution. There was nothing left to
be discussed in mitigation of sentence. Defendant would either pay
restitution or he would not.
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At the August hearing, Defendant provided the court with evidence
that he did not pay restitution. The trial court stated, "Give me the bad
news." R. 288:1. Defense counsel informed the court that Defendant had not
paid restitution, and provided the court with documents purporting to show
the status of the multi-million dollar deal Defendant was allegedly close to
completing, which would provide the funds to pay restitution. See id. at 1-2.
He also stated that if the court took Defendant into custody, that deal would
fall through. See id. at 2. Only then did the trial court interrupt counsel,
saying "give me a break. I gave him a drop dead date and I let him tell me
how long it would take.... It's over. It's over." Id. Counsel attempted to
comment further, but the court cut him off. "No, no, no, it's over." Id. And
later, "No, no, no. We're not talking any more. Enough's enough.... He's
going to prison . . . . " Id. at 3.
While it is true that the trial court interrupted and cut off counsel's
ability to provide further argument about whether or not Defendant should
be given more time to close his alleged multi-million dollar deal, that did not
violate Defendant's right to allocute. The right to allocute encompasses the
right "to provide the defendant personally with an opportunity to address
the court" and "to ensure that the judge is provided with reasonably reliable
and relevant information regarding sentencing." Wanosik, 2003 UT 46, f 19.
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In other words, rule 22(a) "codifies the common-law right... to make a
statement in mitigation/7 Id. at f 18. Here, Defendant and counsel both
made extensive arguments in mitigation at the May hearing. Nothing
changed between the May and August hearings.
The August hearing was set to answer a single question: Did
Defendant pay restitution. The answer, provided by Defendant himself, was
•"no." With that answer in hand, the sentencing court was ready to impose
final sentence, and did so. The setting of the August hearing did not provide
Defendant with the unlimited right to reopen his case in mitigation and reallocute. At the May hearing, he asked only for time to pay restitution. He
was granted that time, but did not deliver. The trial court acted well within
its discretion by allowing no further comment regarding whether or not
Defendant should be given yet more time to close his multi-million dollar art
deal. This is especially true given Defendant's history of dishonesty with the
State Securities Division, his dozens of victims, and the court itself. The
sentencing judge had a history of Defendant promising one thing and then
doing another. See R. 125-141 (Statement of Defendant in Advance of Plea in
Abeyance, wherein Defendant promised to pay restitution and to cease
illegal securities trading); R. at 144 (detailing Defendant's securities
violations, mere days after promising to receive no further violations); R.
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287:50 (Defendant promising to pay approximately $15,000,000 in restitution
within 60 days); R. 288:1 (Defendant informing the court he had not paid
restitution).
The trial court concluded from Defendant's extensive track record that
Defendant was lying from the outset regarding his multi-million dollar deal
and his ability to pay restitution. See id. at 4. Thus, any reasons Defendant
could have proffered to explain either the impending payoff, or in further
mitigation of his failure to pay, would not have been believable. In other
words, the time for mitigation had ended.
Defendant has offered no authority, and the State could find none, that
provides defendants the unlimited right to continue allocuting for as long as
they wish. To the contrary, Defendant vindicated his right to allocution once
he provided "the judge . . . with reasonably reliable and relevant information
regarding sentencing,'7 and made "a statement in mitigation or explanation/7
Wanosik, 2003 UT 46, | | 18-19. The trial court afforded Defendant and his
attorney ample time at the May hearing to address all the relevant issues, and
despite misgivings, indulged Defendant to allow him time to procure funds
to pay restitution.
In sum, the record as a whole demonstrates that Defendant had ample
opportunity to allocute. The trial court did not sentence Defendant to prison
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because it did not listen to what he had to say; it sent him to prison because it
could not believe what he had to say. Because Defendant did in fact allocute,
the trial court did not err.
B. Any error was harmless because Defendant has not
demonstrated what additional information he would have
provided at the August hearing or that the outcome would
have been different.
Even if Defendant had shown error, he has not shown harm. See State
v. Young, 853 P.2d 327,361 (Utah 1993) (applying harmless error analysis to
denial of allocution claim in death penalty case); Utah R. Crim. P. 30(a) (" Any
error, defect, irregularity or variance which does not affect the substantial
rights of a party shall be disregarded/'). A defendant demonstrates harm by
showing that, "absent the error, there is a substantial likelihood of a more
favorable outcome." State v. Ellifritz, 835 P.2d 170,174 (Utah App. 1992).
The only harm Defendant argues is the "increase" from a one year jail
term to an indeterminate prison sentence. See Br. Aplt. at 39-40. He claims
that when "the trial court held a proper sentencing hearing in which the
rights to allocution and due process were protected," the trial court imposed
jail; but when "the trial court violated [Defendant's] right to allocution and
due process" the trial court imposed prison. Id. As demonstrated above,
however, the trial did not impose jail at any time. It discussed jail, and even
offered Defendant a way to obtain that leniency. But it withheld final
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judgment until all relevant information came in, and when it became clear by
Defendant's own admission that he had not paid restitution, the court
sentenced him to prison. The trial court did not "increase" Defendant's
sentence.
Defendant does not argue that the trial court violated his right to
allocute by sentencing him in August; rather, he argues that the trial court
sentenced him without allowing him to finish speaking. See Br. Aplt. at 36.
Thus, to find harm in the trial court's actions, this Court cannot simply
compare the sentence Defendant actually received to the tentative one the
trial court suggested in May. Instead, Defendant must show that the trial
court likely would have entered a more lenient sentence in August, after
receiving word of his failure to pay his victims, and after allowing further
comment by counsel and Defendant himself.
But Defendant does not so much as proffer what further argument or
evidence he would have provided had the trial court allowed him to do so,
nor does he demonstrate that the court would have been compelled to
believe such argument or evidence, given his extensive track record of
dishonesty and lack of follow-through. In short, Defendant has offered no
reason to believe that the trial court would have, in its discretion, treated him
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more leniently if it had only allowed him to say more. Thus, Defendant has
not demonstrated prejudice as the result of any error.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm.
Respectfully submitted 19 October 2011.
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